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CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION IN
HOSPITAL CARE: SOME LESSONS
FROM THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION
Dwayne A. Bankst
Stephen E. Foremantt
Theodore E. Keelerttt
INTRODUCTION
THERE IS MOVEMENT TOWARD more reliance on
competition and less on regulation in the health care sector. This
parallels movements in other parts of the United States economy,
as well as other parts of the world.'
Yet, in the face of this competition, in many of these indus-
tries, there exists a desire to maintain "socially desirable" services.
In many cases, government policy has promoted cross-
subsidization of these services with surplus revenues from more
profitable services. Frequently, however, as competition creeps in,
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ttt Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley. B.A., 1967,
Reed College; S.M., 1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D., 1971, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
1 See, e.g., PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 300 (40 ed. 1993)
(describing how the delivery of medical services in the 1980s moved toward in-
creased market competition rather than regulation); Theodore E. Keeler & Stephen E.
Foreman, Regulation and Deregulation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 213 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (outlining the nature of
several industries which have been subjected to regulation and deregulation, and
noting the recent increase of competition in hospital care).
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regulations and other policies have been insufficient to stem the
erosion of these surplus revenues. In addition, regulatory policies
which endeavor to achieve cross-subsidization of "desirable"
services impose inefficiencies and welfare losses of their own. It is
for these reasons that in the United States and elsewhere, govern-
ment policies toward transport and telecommunications have re-
cently moved away from regulating such cross-subsidization.
In the health care sector, on the other hand, even in the face of
movement toward increased competition, various social policies -
we call them regulations - exist to promote and even enforce the
cross-subsidization of "desirable" services. Hospital care is one
such category of services. We believe there are not only problems
with these policies, but that analogies exist between the hospital
sector and other industries where regulation, cross-subsidization,
and deregulation have occurred. It is the aim of this Article to set
forth these analogies, as well as elucidate the lessons to be learned
for the hospital sector.
Many health lawyers and economists believe that "health care
is different" from other industries in which cross-subsidization is a
social policy, to the extent that lessons from elsewhere are inappli-
cable. Others believe that, if there is a similarity between health
care and other industries, the degree of cross-subsidization is so
small in U.S. hospital care, the lessons to be learned are at best
limited. The recent papers by Mark Krause2 and by John Colombo
and Mark Hall 3 are not consistent with this view, however. They
are much more consistent with the arguments advanced in this Ar-
ticle, and their consistency will be explained later. It is, thus, an
important part of this Article to present evidence that: (1) regula-
tion indeed really exists in hospital care, endeavoring to enforce
cross-subsidization - just as in railroads or airlines before 1978-
80, and (2) the amount of cross-subsidization that these social
policies attempt to enforce is not small; indeed, it is demonstrably
just as large in magnitude as the cross-subsidization required of
U.S. railroads (to support money-losing passenger service) prior to
Amtrak in 1970.
2 Mark Krause, Comment, First Do No Hann: An Analysis of the Nonprofit
Hospital Sale Act, 45 UCLA L. REv. 503 (1997) (discussing whether non-profit hos-
pitals should be regulated under the Nonprofit Hospital Sale Acts, and suggesting that
the litigation regime the Acts replaced is superior).
3 John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-Exemption for Non-
profit Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1992) (as-
sessing the potential impact of proposed federal legislation on tax exemption of non-
profit hospitals and other health care providers).
[Vol. 9:1
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION IN HOSPITAL CARE
The first section of this Article presents an analysis of the ori-
gins of regulation in the British-American legal systems, its early
evolution in the United States, and its relationship to more recently
developed theories of regulatory behavior. The second section pre-
sents a summary of regulations that encourage and enforce cross-
subsidization in U.S. hospital care, and their legal basis. The third
section discusses the evolution and ultimate failure of regulation in
inter-city passenger and freight transportation industries in the
United States. The fourth and fifth sections are concerned with
direct comparisons between transportation and hospital care. Two
questions are of concern: (1) what is the size of the cross-subsidy
to indigent patients in hospitals (we base our estimates on Califor-
nia hospital data); and (2) is the constraint to cross-subsidize hos-
pital care as legally binding as it was in transportation (and to
some degree, still is in telecommunications)? In addition, we in-
vestigate, in some detail, the extent to which the legal constraint to
cross-subsidize in hospital care is as strong as that which occurred
in transportation and telecommunications prior to 1980. The sixth
section discusses the mechanism by which firm rivalry erodes the
surplus revenues used to cross-subsidize "socially desirable" serv-
ices. Finally, we summarize the lessons to be learned for the hos-
pital sector, based upon experience from other industries in which
public policy has attempted to combine regulation and competi-
tion.
I. ORIGINS, PRINCIPLES, AND THEORIES OF
REGULATION
Regulation, as found in transportation and utilities, dates to
the medieval period in England.4 The sovereign granted monopoly
privileges to carriers of goods and people in return for important
benefits to the state and public. These benefits included (1) equal
access for all at "reasonable" rates; (2) a guarantee of service (car-
riers could not discontinue service arbitrarily); and (3) strict as-
sumption of liability by carriers for loss and damage to freight and
injury to passengers.5 The charter that gave carriers monopoly
rights on routes, in return for providing these services, bestowed a
4 See THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 19
(1983). For a more extensive discussion of the common law background of regulation
in the transportation industry, see also Keeler & Foreman, supra note 1, at 215-17.
5 Except for "natural" tragedy such as weather-related loss and "criminal" ac-
tivity like highway robbery.
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"certificate of public convenience and necessity." Those who fol-
lowed the carrier rules became "common carriers."
The U.S. laws relating to transportation and utilities used the
British common law of "common carriage" as their basis. The first
U.S. transportation laws were related to horse-drawn services.
With the development of canals and railroads, state and local gov-
ernments gave these carriers similar certificates of public conven-
ience and necessity. Initially, courts enforced the law of common
carriage through case law. As regulation intensified in the late 19th
century, federal, state, and local governments codified the law of
common carriage and established regulatory agencies.
6
As electricity, telecommunications, highway, and air trans-
portation came into existence, public regulation was extended to
them based on similar principles. Regulatory schemes required
new entrants to have certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity. Special agencies regulated rates and the volume of service.
A. The Economic Theory of Regulation7
Traditionally, most economists believed that regulation had as
its goals "public interest" objectives: efficient allocation of re-
sources and equitable distribution of income. To the extent that
regulators failed to meet these objectives, economic observers
cited poor execution. This perspective changed as studies began to
conclude that regulation appeared to systematically misallocate
resources in the public sector.8 Olson argued that the collective
political process, operating in ways that make "rational" sense, can
quite readily fail to achieve economically efficient outcomes.
9
From this, George Stiglerl° developed the "economic theory" of
regulation. Richard Posner," Sam Peltzman,1 2 Gary Becker,'
3
6 For example, state agencies for intrastate transportation and the Federal Inter-
state Commerce Commission. See Keeler & Foreman, supra note 1, at 215 (discuss-
ing the change from regulation by corporate charter and common law to statutory and
agency regulation of transportation).
7 See generally Keeler & Foreman, supra note 1, at 213, for a more detailed
discussion of these issues, and of their relevance to transportation and healthcare.
8 See JOHN R. MEYER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 3-17 (1959); RICHARD E. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORTATION
AND ITS REGULATORS (1962).
9 MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
1o See generally George J. Steigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3 (1971).
11 Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22
(1971) (explaining the "taxation by regulation" feature of the regulatory process).
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Theodore Keeler,' 4 and Pablo Spiller 5 extended the theory in vari-
ous directions. Roger Noll16 extended, discussed, and summarized
the various iterations of the theory.
George Stigler argued that in a representative democracy like
the United States, there is a supply of and a demand for regulation
established through the political process. Regulation will benefit
either producers or consumers (or some combination) depending
on the costs and benefits accruing to each. The probability that a
group will successfully achieve regulation depends on the group's
costs of achieving a coalition - organizing politically - compared
to the benefits the group will receive in the form of higher output
prices.
Sam Peltzman extended, refined, and formalized Stigler's
theory. Each regulator will maximize a political support function
in which political support is a function of regulatory benefits to
interest groups. Each group (both for producers and consumers)
contains different subgroups. The first order condition for the
maximization process is that the marginal political support to sub-
sidize a particular user group should equal the marginal political
support for other groups. This can result in a decision to cross-
subsidize: in particular, charging consumers higher prices to sub-
sidize producers, and charging some consumers higher prices to
subsidize other consumers.
Gary Becker and Theodore Keeler establish that there is a link
between the economic and public interest theories. Keeler notes
that the economic theory of regulation is equivalent to a "many
12 Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
EcoN. 211 (1976) (extending George Steigler's theory that regulatory agencies will
not exclusively serve a single interest).
13 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Politi-
cal Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983) (presenting a "theory of the political redistri-
bution of income and of other public policies that builds up on competition among
pressure groups for political favors").
14 Theodore E. Keeler, Theories of Regulation and the Deregulation Movement,
44 PUB. CHOICE 103 (1984). (considering three potential alternatives to explain the
history' of regulation and deregulation of industries by the U.S. government).
Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-
Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed," 33 J.L. & ECON.
65 (1990) (expanding the self-interest theory of regulation to account for the potential
agency problems between Congress and its regulators).
16 Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1254, (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989) (providing an interpretative survey focusing on research that em-
ploys the conceptual model and methods of economics and uses "economic theoreti-
cal ... arguments to make predictions about political behavior...").
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person Ramsey tax" in which the marginal political support avail-
able from each group is the equivalent of a "welfare weight." Sat-
isfaction of the group's interest also satisfies the public interest.'
7
Pablo Spiller extends the theory to take account that regulatory
agencies are in fact agents of legislatures, who can in fact monitor
regulators only imperfectly. Spiller develops a principal-agent the-
ory of regulators based on this fact.
Charles Phelps' 8 has applied the Peltzman theory of regulation
to hospitals, noting that the boards of trustees of many nonprofit
hospitals act like a powerful interest group in a Peltzman-like
model, exerting pressure on the hospital to cross-subsidize charity
patients. Below, we carry the argument a step further, arguing that
the community itself puts pressure on the hospital (its board and its
management) in the manner of a Peltzman-style regulator to cross-
subsidize, so that even for-profit hospitals (which certainly have an
incentive not to cross-subsidize at all) are unable to escape pro-
viding charity care.
HI. REGULATION IN HOSPITAL CARE
A. Formal regulation in hospital care
Heretofore, with a few notable exceptions (most especially all
the articles in a volume by Sloan, Blumstein, and Perrin),19 the
principal economic focus of studies of health care and hospital
regulation has concentrated on apparent and direct rule-making.
The most obvious is rate regulation. While the federal government
has generally refrained from universal rate regulation of health
care, several states have actively set rates, at least for hospital
services. Economic analysis of these rate setting programs has
concentrated on their ability to "control costs" and their subse-
quent impact on expenditures for the regulated service (e.g., hos-
17 An extension of the economic theory of regulation in transportation, in com-
munications, and in medical care suggests the possibility of a "hidden" surrogate
theory. Just as protection of the farmers' interests translated into regulation that bene-
fited the railroads, and radio and television stations operated "in the public interest"
with substantial economic benefit to license holders, a great deal of regulation that
aims to benefit uninsured hospital patients inures to the economic benefit of hospi-
tals. Hospitals may be the largest beneficiaries of cross subsidies.
18 Charles E. Phelps, Cross-Subsidies and Charge-Shifting in American Hospi-
tals, in UNCOMPENSATED HEALTH CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 108, 108-25
(Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
19 See id. (presenting papers delivered at a conference focusing on individual
rights to healthcare and how services should be allocated).
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pital services). 20 These studies have sparked debate over the effec-
tiveness of regulation in controlling costs. They had not, by and
large, considered the impact of rate regulation in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency or in terms of its effect on other segments of the
industry.
The federal government's setting of rates for hospital and
physician services under the Medicare program provides another
obvious and direct form of health care rate regulation. Although
technically hospitals and physicians can avoid this regulation by
avoiding Medicare patients, the large fraction of physician hospital
business accounted for by Medicare patients makes these controls
tantamount to regulation, and they have been seen as such by many
economists. 2' Approximately thirty-five percent of all U.S. per-
sonal health care expenditures, and forty-five percent of hospital
expenditures, occur under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
22
In 1984, Medicare began paying hospitals a standardized, prospec-
tively determined amount, based on the diagnostic related group
(DRG) payment system.23 In 1991, this payment philosophy was
expanded to include physician services in the form of a resource-
based relative value system (RVRBS). 24 Accordingly, a significant
share of American health care payment is currently subject to a
20 See, e.g., Craig Coelen & Daniel Sullivan, An Analysis of the Effects of Pro-
spective Reimbursement Programs on Hospital Expenditures, HEALTH CARE FI-
NANCING REV., Winter 1981, at 1 (discussing the effect of various voluntary and in-
voluntary state prospective review programs on hospital expenditures); David Dra-
nove & Kenneth Cone, Do State Rate-Setting Programs Really Lower Hospital Ex-
penses?, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 159 (1985) (investigating whether the success of man-
datory hospital rate-setting programs are due to regulatory success or to the "regres-
sion to the mean"); Frank A. Sloan & Edmund R. Becker, Internal Organization of
Hospitals and Hospital Costs, INQUIRY 224 (1981) (discussing how organizational
factors affect hospital costs, and concluding that hospital expenses are lowered when
hospital-based physicians are compensated under incentive contracts); FELDSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 289-90.
21 See, e.g., REGULATING DOCTORS' FEES: COMPETITION, BENEFITS, AND
CONTROLS UNDER MEDICARE (H.E. Frech M ed., 1991) (analyzing the changes in the
way physicians are compensated under Medicare, in terms of economics and health
policy).2 See Katherine L Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1994 HEALTH
CARE FINANCNING REV., Spring 1996, at 234-35 (demonstrating personal and hospital
care expenditures for 1960-94).
23 See FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 291-93 (providing a recent survey of the evi-
dence of the effects of DRGs on Medicare hospital expenditures).
24 See REGULATING DOCTORS' FEES, supra note 21, for an a priori critique.
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form of rate regulation.25 As with state rate setting, most economic
studies of the impact of the federal payment system have concen-
trated on payments and not on the economic effectiveness of the
programs.
Furthermore, the federal government and the states have
regulated "quantity" and "quality" in the form of certificate of
need (CON) laws and regulations. CON has as its principal thrust
the elimination of unnecessary and costly duplication of services
by hospitals. Starting with rudimentary (and generally voluntary)
hospital planning regulations in the 1960s,26 nationwide capital
expenditure review began with the enactment of the CON law.
27
These strictures, enacted at the federal level, required each state to
approve most new capital expenditures and services of hospitals.28
The underlying rationale was, if all hospitals could not acquire
new technology or offer new services, the few who did extend
these service would provide them more efficiently. States imple-
mented CON with varying degrees of stringency. A number of
studies concluded that CON had not been effective; hence, the
Reagan administration repealed the mandate that states have a
CON program.29 However, while several states have abolished
health-planning review, a number still retain the program. Few
studies have assessed the economic impact of CON or the validity
of its underlying rationale.
Finally, most states strictly regulate hospital, physician, and
other provider services in the form of state licensing requirements
which attempt to regulate quality. In the process, however, they
may indirectly impose quantity controls as well. While different
states have different levels of licensing requirements, the total ef-
fect of a state's licensing programs is pervasive.3 0 There has been
25 Further, state Medicaid programs and private insurers, particularly Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans, commonly mimic federal Medicare payment practices, so the
pervasiveness of rate regulation is even greater.
26 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1994) (defining capital expen-
ditures as "expenditure[s] which ... [are] not properly chargeable as an expense of
operation and maintenance" and which exceeds a de minimus amount, originally set
at $20,000).
27 The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1991).
28 In excess of a de minimis amount, initially set at $200,000. See id.
29 See FELDSTEIN, supra note I, at 271-77 (surveying the evidence of the effects
of CON regulations on the expansion of the health care system and controlling hos-
pital investment).
30 For example, the California licensing laws fill several library shelves. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1200-1794.29 (West 1998).
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little economic evaluation of the effect of these programs on other
sectors of the health economy.
In summary, there is much direct, obvious regulation of health
care by most measures. If the experience gained from transporta-
tion and utilities is any guide, the pervasiveness of obvious regu-
lation has substantial economic implications. However, there are
"hidden" regulations that impose even greater regulatory burdens
on the delivery of health care services. These hidden regulations
are even less studied.
B. Hidden Regulation In Hospital Care
The universal practice of cross-subsidizing patient services in
the U.S. health care system is the predominant mode of hidden
regulation in the industry. Historically, cross-subsidies have been a
tradition in this sector of the economy. 3' Furthermore, with in-
creasing attention to universal health care access for all Ameri-
cans, the pressure for increased levels of cross-subsidization will
continue to grow.
Currently, the law provides legitimacy for the cross-
subsidization of hospital care. Most state level anti-dumping laws,
along with the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA), 32 make it illegal for hospitals to deny emergency treat-
ment to patients - irrespective of their ability to pay.33 On the sur-
face, this sounds ethical and fair. However, consider the effect of a
law that requires a grocer to distribute food to those who are un-
able to pay for it. Yet, that is precisely what the Act requires of
hospitals. In order for hospitals to care for nonpaying or under-
31 See generally ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH (1989) (pro-
viding an extensive survey of the roles of, and external influences on, U.S. hospitals
during the 20' century). See also Uwe Reinhartdt, Uncompensated Hospital Care, in
UNCOMPENSATED HEALTH CAPE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 18 (pro-
viding an excellent historical and philosophical discussion of charity care); Frank A.
Sloan et al., Idenyifying the Issues: A Statistical Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED HEALTH
CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 18, at 16 (providing empirical find-
ings regarding questions surrounding social issues associated with uncompensated
hospital care).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994) (providing examination and treatment provisions
concerning emergency medical conditions for hospitals that have an emergency de-
partment).
3 See Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emer-
gency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV. 449, 480 (1994).
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34paying patients, they simply overcharge paying patients to cover
their uncompensated costs.
The ability and willingness of governments to compel such
behavior is much older than COBRA. Students of regulation rec-
ognize it readily. Forcing hospitals to treat patients for less than
full price constitutes enforced cross-subsidization, a policy histori-
cally and commonly pursued in the markets for transportation and
utilities. While COBRA codifies hospital cross-subsidization for
emergency room services, hospital cross-subsidization was perva-
sive prior to its adoption. 35 For example, cross-subsidization man-
dates attach to.hospital incorporation, tax status, accreditation, and
even to principles of legal liability. Indeed, most U.S. hospitals
were established between 1890 and 1930 as charitable entities
(generally staffed by religious orders or operated as government
entities). They were primarily located in urban areas, to provide
health services to those in need and, either implicitly or explicitly,
without regard to ability to pay. 36 Prior to 1935, patients paid for
hospital care out-of-pocket. Wealthy patients generally received
care from physicians and nurses in the comfort of their homes.
Conversely, low-income individuals received their care primarily
from charitable hospitals. Hence historically, cross-subsidization
has been a cornerstone of the American hospital industry.
In order to incorporate as a charitable organization, 37 a hospi-
tal must acquire a "charter" from its state of incorporation. The
hospital's charter contains a statement of "charitable purpose,"
often relating to care of the sick and injured irrespective of ability
to pay. Courts have held that the assets of a charitable hospital be-
come impressed with the charitable purpose expressed in its char-
34 The number of non-paying patients treated by hospitals is large. From 1990 to
1992, the percentage of uncompensated care patients treated by U.S. hospitals aver-
aged 5.9%. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH
INSURANCEDATA 1994, at 100 (1995).
35 Michael Morrisey argues persuasively that cross-subsidization (what health
economists call cost shifting) is, in reality, merely price discrimination. However, to
the extent that some of the hospital's patients receive care at less than the hospital's
marginal cost of treatment (certainly the case for free care), economic distortions will
result. See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, COST SHIFTING IN HEALTH CARE: SEPARATING
EVIDENCE FROM RHETORIC 46-59 (1994).
36 See generally Peter Temin, An Economic History of American Hospitals, in
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH
INSURANCE 75, 78-81 (H.E. Frech, lI ed., 1988) (discussing the early development of
the modem hospital system).
37 Most U.S. hospitals are nonprofit corporations.
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ter: the "charitable trust" doctrine.38 Each state enforces the chari-
table trust doctrine for the intended beneficiaries. In essence, the
very charitable nature of the hospital's incorporation establishes a
cross-subsidy.
The grant of privileges to the hospital can also establish cross-
subsidies (this is highly analogous to regulated railroads and air-
lines; both land grants and the establishment of monopoly power in
return for social services represent such quid pro quo regulatory
behavior). Most nonprofit hospitals are exempt from payment of
local, state, and federal taxes. 39 However, in order to maintain this
exemption, there exists a requirement that hospitals provide a cer-
tain level of "charitable" or uncompensated care.4° In this case, the
quid pro quo for tax exemption is cross-subsidization.
Another example of this phenomenon is the Hill-Burton Act.4'
The Hill-Burton Act provided nonprofit hospitals with construc-
tion funds in return for a designated level of charitable care - for a
specified period of time. As hospitals reached the limits of their
charitable care obligations, the federal government sought ways to
extend them.42 Indeed, government policies towards hospitals
saying, in effect, "we gave you Hill-Burton money; now you give
us free charity care"43 very closely paralleled the regulatory atti-
tude that prevailed towards railroads for years: "we gave you land
grants and exclusive operating rights; now you give us passenger
trains and money-losing branch lines."
m See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (holding the Attorney General had no authority to prohibit a corporation from
operating a clinic pursuant to the corporation's charitable purposes, outlined in the
articles of incorporation).
39 Tax exemption and access to tax-exempt revenue bond financing are the ma-
jor points of nonprofit incorporation.
40 See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah
1995) (listing factors that must be weighed in determining whether a hospital quali-
fies as a "charity" for tax exemption purposes); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (discussing class action brought by organi-
zations representing indigent individuals against the IRS, stating that agency violated
Internal Revenue Code and Administrative Procedure Act by allowing nonprofit
status to a hospital that limited indigent care to emergency room services).
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1991) (establishing governmental funding to non-
profit hospitals that promote charitable services).
42 For example, the litigation produced by the Carter administration's attempts
to extend the charitable care obligations. See American Hospital Ass'n v. Schweiker,
721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
43 See James F. Blumstein, Providing Hospital Care to Indigent Patients: Hill-
Burton as a Case Study and a Paradigm, in UNCOMPENSATED HEALTH CARE: RIGHTs
AND RESPONSIBILrnS, supra note 18 (discussing the obligations of hospitals receiv-
ing Hill-Burton funding to provide charity care).
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To conclude this section, we note that U. S. hospitals face le-
gal requirements to cross-subsidize that appear very substantial.
But, one might ask, "so what?" and "are these subsidies really sub-
stantial?" The amount of money involved could be very small and
the legal requirements effectively weak, or vice versa. We address
these issues in the following sections. However, we first consider
the effects of mandatory cross-subsidization in transportation and
telecommunications. In the subsequent section we estimate the size
of the cross-subsidy in hospital care, and the punishments faced by
hospitals that fail to adequately cross-subsidize.
I11. REGULATION AND CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION
IN TRANSPORTATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Economic theories of regulation explain much about the evo-
lution of U.S. regulatory policy in transportation and utilities. Such
regulation: (1) restricted the entry of new firms, (2) caused provid-
ers to offer some services above marginal cost, others below cost,
and many at different price-cost margins from the levels of a free
market, (3) blocked exit from unprofitable services that were con-
sidered "socially desirable or necessary," and (4) gave many pro-
ducers excess rents.
In the simplest of terms, regulation always had as its goal the
cross-subsidization of certain services. This was accomplished by
providing excess rents to certain factors of production. Crucial
components of this strategy were restrictions on entry into profit-
able services - to maintain the flow of excess rents - as well as
restrictions on exit from unprofitable ones.
The economic theory of regulation explains why regulation
occurred. What does it say about the reforms of the 1970s and
1980s? Under economic theory, regulation will cease to occur if its
costs become too high; in other words, if it fails to contribute a net
increase in political support for the elected officials who caused
the regulation to occur. Keeler, Noll, and Peltzman have dealt with
these issues in some detail. 44 There exist two reasons why these
44 Noll and Peltzman deal more broadly with industries than does Keeler, whose
analysis deals more with transportation. Compare Keeler, supra note 14, at 108-15,
with Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregu-
lation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrIvrY I (Martin Neil Bailey & Clif-
ford Winston eds., 1989) (evaluating the success of the economic theory of regulation
in light of the changes in regulatory institutions); Roger G. Noll, Comments on
Peltzman, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTivrrv 48-58 (arguing that an eco-
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costs became too high in the transportation and telecommunica-
tions industries in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. First, it is clear
that many of the technological motivations for regulation (natural
monopoly) that existed in the 1930s no longer existed by the
1970s, or even earlier. Thus, airlines and long-distance telecom-
munications had far higher traffic densities in the late 1970s than
in the 1930s, and they were much further from being natural mo-
nopolies. Believers in the economic theory of regulation might ar-
gue that scale economies are relevant only to the case of public
interest regulators. However, this is disputed by Keeler: a regulator
following the economic theory is nothing other than that of a pub-
lic interest regulator exercising uneven welfare weights and hence,
is as likely to pay attention to scale economies as a public interest
regulator.45 Second, there is evidence that by the 1970s (indeed, by
the 1950s), regulation was at least to some degree failing to
achieve its purposes. This was occurring without reference to
changes in scale economies.
Inter-city passenger transportation supported at least two
forms of cross-subsidization. First, airlines cross-subsidized
shorter-haul and lower-density traffic with profits from longer-
haul, higher-density traffic. Second, railroads (at least until the
creation of Amtrak in 1971) cross-subsidized money-losing pas-
senger service with profits from freight. "Cream-skimming" com-
petition undermined both forms of cross-subsidization. Although
regulation controlled entry of new airlines and fares, service qual-
ity (frequency and capacity) rivalry tended to dissipate rents in-
tended for cross-subsidies. Truck and barge competition (superior
service quality, even at equivalent regulated rates and with regu-
lated entry in trucking) eliminated the excess rents which railroads
were to use to cross-subsidize passengers. Perhaps. the first study
to carefully document many of these failures was John Meyer and
his associates in 1959.46 Similar problems with airlines were
pointed out shortly thereafter by Richard Caves 47 and Michael Le-
vine.48
nomic theory of the political process needs to be considerably broader than the Chi-
cago theories of regulation).
45 See Keeler, supra note 14, at 106.
4 MEYER ET AL., supra note 8, at 12-14.
47 CAVES, supra note 8.
48 See Michael E. Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transporta-
tion and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965) (providing a history
of airline regulation, and comparing that with the airline market in California, the
"only. . . major unrelated market").
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The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) enforced two
main types of cross-subsidization for freight: profitable services
were to cross-subsidize unprofitable routes (low-density branch
lines) and unprofitable commodities (some agricultural goods,
among others). However, competition by trucks and barges elimi-
nated the excess rents. Dissipation of rail rents left firms with in-
adequate funds to make labor "payoffs" (high wages and "feather-
bedding" work rules) that built up over the years.
Regulators in telecommunications expected the profits from
long-distance services to cross-subsidize local services. This
worked for a number of years. However, despite the best efforts of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and state agen-
cies, competing long-distance operators offered ever-expanding
competition. Here, too, market forces undermined intended cross-
subsidization, although, as pointed out by Noll, 49 cross-
subsidization still flourished when AT&T agreed to the consent
decree. Nonetheless, the overall effect of the consent decree was to
eliminate it.
Regulation in transportation and telecommunications not only
failed to achieve its goals, but produced inefficient outcomes. In
airlines and freight transportation, economists argued that the mar-
ket forces that undermined cross-subsidization (service quality ri-
valry among airlines) entailed substantial waste of resources
(empty plane seats or empty truck back hauls). Furthermore, serv-
ices such as long-haul passenger trains and low-density rail branch
lines became economically obsolete. Operating them occasioned a
resource waste that regulators either tolerated or, urged by political
forces, supported.
Over time, the costs attributable to these inefficiencies out-
weighed the economic and political benefits produced by regula-
tion. As suggested by the economic theory of regulation, these in-
efficiencies produced much of the impetus for regulatory reform.
There exists a substantial literature indicating that, by and large,
regulatory reform has greatly enhanced economic efficiency in
transportation and telecommunications, largely along lines pre-
dicted by economists? ° There is, however, another important out-
come of deregulation in transportation and telecommunications
49 See Noll, supra note 44.
,0 For a survey of the evidence in these areas, see Clifford Winston, Economic
Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON. LrTERATURE
1263 (1993).
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that is somewhat less remarked in the literature: direct subsidies
often replaced failed cross-subsidization schemes.
These are not the sole reasons for deregulation in transporta-
tion and telecommunications, but they are important ones. Moreo-
ver, they are highly relevant to the health care sector. In recent
years, market forces have undermined health care regulation, and
there is a parallel "deregulation" movement occurring in the in-
dustry. We will discuss these changes, but first we show that the
size and importance of regulation in the hospital sector are of the
same order of magnitude as that which prevailed in transportation.
In fact, the problems attending this sector of the economy are
likely to be the same as those which occurred in transportation.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATION IN
HOSPITAL CARE - AMOUNT OF THE CROSS-
SUBSIDY
It is crucial that we establish the amount of cross-
subsidization in hospital care and its importance. 51 For if the
amount is small, though required, or is of a pro forma ceremonial
nature with no real effects, then our comparison between cross-
subsidization in hospital care and that of transportation and tele-
communications is in error. These issues are addressed in this sec-
tion.
A. Measurement of the Cost of Uncompensated Care -
Conceptual Issues 5
2
It has sometimes been asserted that uncompensated care in
hospitals is less expensive than one might think because even
though the average cost is high, the marginal cost is low. For this
assertion to make any theoretical sense whatsoever, one of two
things must be true: (1) there must be sharply increasing returns to
scale in hospitals, which makes long-run marginal costs below
long-run average costs, or (2) there must be excess capacity
(which cannot be eliminated anytime soon), which makes short-
run marginal costs below short-run average costs. However, em-
pirical evidence lends no support to the idea that most hospitals,
especially in urban areas, operate in an area of long-run increasing
51 See generally Sloan et al., supra note 31 (providing some careful earlier esti-
mates of these costs, and noting that further research is needed).52 For a well-presented discussion of these issues, see generally Phelps, supra
note 18.
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returns to scale.53 Therefore, such arguments must be based on the
existence of excess bed capacity in hospitals, and the resultant dif-
ference between marginal and average costs - with that capacity
fixed.
However, many hospitals have closed; hence capacity is not
fixed. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, we base our esti-
mates of the magnitude of cross-subsidy on both long- and short-
run marginal costs - not on some notion of average fully distrib-
uted costs. In addition, our estimates of the avoidable costs of in-
digent (uncompensated) patients are for the state of California, one
of the most competitive, free-market hospital environments in the
United States.
B. Data and Empirical Analysis
To estimate our short-run cost function, we include a size
variable in the equation, a size variable judged to be fixed in the
short run. Short-run marginal costs can be estimated by calculating
the partial derivative with respect to the relevant output (uncom-
pensated inpatient days). That this is so was established theoreti-
cally some time ago.54 To estimate our long-run cost function, we
exclude the size variable, and work from the assumption that hos-
pitals in the sample have optimized bed capacity. Taking the par-
tial derivative of such an estimated functional relationship yields a
measure of the long-run resource cost of accommodating an extra,
uncompensated patient (or any equivalent output).55 In the context
of hospital cost estimation, these issues have been set forth in
greater detail by Ennis, Schoenbaum, and Keeler. 6
53 See FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 224-30 (describing the relationship between
hospital size and average cost, as well as the variation of average cost among hospi-
tals).
U 4 See, e.g., MEYER Er AL.., supra note 8 (analyzing the cost characteristics of
various modes of transportation); Theodore E. Keeler, Railroad Costs, Returns to
Scale, and Excess Capacity, 56 REv. ECON. & STAT. 201 (1974).
55 See generally MEYER ETAL., supra note 8; Keeler, supra note 54, at 201.
56 Sean F. Ennis et al., Optimal Prices and Costs for Hospitals with Excess Bed
Capacity, Presented to the Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Conference on Health
Econ. (Oct. 23, 1998) (manuscript on file with author). Further crucial issues in hos-
pital cost estimation relate to costs of staffed versus unstaffed beds. For present pur-
poses, we note that, for reasons set forth by Ennis, et al., the propensity to staff only
beds which are expected to be in use on the part of a hospital will result in an under-
estimate of the marginal cost of accommodating an extra patient, even in the short-
run. That is because those hospitals which have higher occupancy rates may not have
anticipated those occupancy rates, and hence may not have adequately staffed beds
for those higher rates. Id. This set of arguments was first set forth for hospitals by
Friedman and Pauly. See Bernard Friedman & Mark Pauly, Cost Functions for a
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The sample consisted of a pooled cross-section time series of
California acute care hospitals, spanning the period FY1986-
FY1990. This resulted in an unbalanced panel of 1,891 non-Kaiser
acute care hospitals (Kaiser hospitals are not required to report
uncompensated care). The number and type of hospitals for each
year are presented in Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the series
are presented in Table 1.58 Regression results are presented in Ta-
ble 3.59
We estimate the marginal cost of an indigent patient accord-
ing to a quadratic multiproduct cost function, first developed by
Friedlaender, Winston, and Wang. 6° This form has several advan-
tages, including the fact that it is not necessary to estimate factor
share equations or factor share constraints as is done with the
translog. Furthermore, as explained by Friedlaender et al.,6' unlike
the translog function, the present cost function allows total inde-
pendence among outputs in determining costs, though it does not
require it. The cost function estimated is given by Equation (1),
below:
(1)
COST=O+f3Yl+ 2Y2+ 3 Y3+f34 Y4+35Ys+aWAGE+(0.5) i
Y j+ijYij+EiailYi*WAGE+a2WAGE 2+aIBEDS
+X-iaiYi*BEDS+a 2 BEDS*WAGE+ 22BEDS2+cp ,ALOS+E
i.p.iYi*ALOS+cp, 2ALOS*WAGE+ o3ALOS *BEDS
+(P33ALOS2+OINON+0 2PUB+0 3DIS+0 4DUMMY+0 5T+g
The following additional constraints were placed upon our pa-
rameter estimates: 3i=13ji. Upon applications of Shepard's lemma,
the following factor demand equation was derived from Equation
Service Firm with Variable Quality and Stochastic Demand: The Case of Hospitals,
63 REv. ECON. & STAT. 620 (1981) (deriving and testing cost functions for firms
observed over time when demand is stochastic and unobserved qualitative deteriora-
tion in output is possible, and applying this analysis to hospital costs).
57 See Table 2, infra page 28.
58 See Table 1, infra pp. 26-27. The low wage figures in Table 1 are due to the
fact that they average in imputed values for volunteer labor, of which hospitals use a
considerable amount. This approach was deemed superior to ignoring volunteer la-
bor.
59 See Table 3, infra pp. 29-34.
60 Ann F. Friedlaender et al., Costs, Technology, and Productivity in the U.S.
Automobile Industry, 14 BELL J. EON. I (1983) (analyzing the "structure of costs,
technology, and productivity in the U.S. automobile industry by estimating a general
hedonic joint cost function for domestic automotive production" for major U.S.
automobile manufacturers).
61 Id.
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(1), where Xj is the total productive hours worked by hospital em-
ployees:
(2)
Xj=aCOST/aWAGE=a1 +icaiiYi+2a 2WAGE+tpl 2ALOS+P 21BEDS+F
where,
COST= total hospital expenditures.
Y, = total number of indigent (uncompensated) inpatient
days (INDI).
Y2 = total number of Medicaid inpatient days (MEDCD).
Y3 = total number of Medicare inpatient days (MEDCR).
Y4 = total number of private patient inpatient days (PRV).
Y5 = total number of outpatient visits (OUT).
WAGE = average hospital specific wage rate.
BEDS = total number of beds.
ALOS = average length of patient stay.
NON = dummy variable for nonprofit hospitals.
DIS = dummy variable for district hospitals.
PUB = dummy variable for public hospitals.
DUMMY = dummy variable for hospitals that report zero
indigent care.
T = time trend variable (FY1986 to FY1990)
The factor demand depicted by Equation (2) was simultane-
ously estimated with Equation (1), given the intercorrelation which
exists among the error terms of each. We, therefore, employed Zell-
ner's method of seemingly unrelated regressions.
B. Results - New Estimates of Amounts of Cross-Subsidization
The results of the estimation procedures (with and without the
"beds" variable included) are shown in Table 3.62 All output vari-
ables are of the expected signs and highly significant. It is clear
that the marginal cost of an inpatient day for an uncompensated
patient is at least as high as that for anyone else. This gives doubt
to the view that uncompensated care patients are somehow "low-
cost" compared with others.
It is worth noting as well that the marginal cost estimates (of
all patient types) with and without the "beds" variables vary as
expected. The estimated coefficient for an inpatient day is consis-
tently lower with beds included than with that variable excluded.
62 See Table 3, infra pp. 29-34.
[VOL. 9:1
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION IN HOSPITAL CARE
That is consistent with our earlier theoretical discussion which
suggests that if beds are included in the equation, that should gen-
erate an estimate of the short-run marginal cost of a patient,
whereas exclusion of beds will generate the long-run marginal
cost.
By either measure, uncompensated care patients account for a
significant part of hospital revenues. Table 4 indicates the total
avoidable costs of accommodating uncompensated care patients,
based on simulations for mean values of all the independent vari-
ables (i.e., for a hospital of average size, with average wages, etc.)
varying only the type of hospital (private nonprofit, private for-
profit, and government) and the number of uncompensated care
patients accommodated on average by each hospital type. 63 The
results indicate that the total avoidable cost of uncompensated care
is three to four percent of total costs for nonprofit hospitals, and
two to three percent for for-profit hospitals (these numbers are all
for the relatively competitive California hospital market). This
compares with evidence from other studies (cited below) that un-
compensated care patients are anywhere from four to six percent of
patients in private hospitals. Below we compare this burden of
cross-subsidization, with the classic case of failed regulation in the
transportation industry.
C. Comparison of Results with Cross-Subsidization Under Rail
Regulation in the 1955-1970 Period
One possible objection to the analogy made here is that, even
if the cross-subsidization of indigent patients in hospitals resem-
bles past regulatory policies in transport and telecommunications,
the amount of the cross-subsidy in health care is sufficiently small
so as to make the analogy meaningless. In this subsection, we pre-
sent evidence that proves this view to be wrong.
Amtrak was formed when rail passenger deficits (an acknowl-
edged and untenable form of cross-subsidization) became an intol-
erable burden on U.S. railroads. We will now show that the burden
of indigent patients on U.S. hospitals in the late 1990s is in fact
greater than the burden that passenger trains were on U.S. railroads
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1968, shortly before Amtrak
was formed because of these burdensome passenger deficits, the
passenger deficit faced by Class I U.S. railroads was estimated to
63 See Table 4, infra page 35.
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be between $200 and $490 million, or 1.8 to 4.5% of total rail op-
erating revenues, which were $10.9 billion in that year.64
By comparison, the estimate of three to four percent of hos-
pital revenues from indigent care for private, nonprofit hospitals,
or even two to three percent for proprietary hospitals in California
is certainly a meaningfully large number. And both were reached
through very similar techniques as avoidable costs; one of the
authors of this Article was a contributor to the earlier literature on
wasted resources from cross-subsidization in transportation, and he
can testify that the methods used to arrive at these numbers are
quite comparable. If anyone believes that the burden of cross-
subsidization in U.S. hospital care in the late 1990s is small com-
pared with that faced by regulated industries in the United States,
the burden is most certainly on him or her to show it; our evidence
certainly suggests otherwise.
V. IMPORTANCE OF REGULATION IN HOSPITAL
CARE - HOW MUCH OF A LEGAL CONSTRAINT
IS IT?
We have now established that the amount of uncompensated
care that a typical hospital provides in one of the most unregulated
states in the Union is substantial. This is the case, even by com-
parison with the level of cross-subsidization that occurred in the
heyday of the CAB for airlines - taking account of the assertion by
some that, with excess hospital capacity, the marginal cost of un-
compensated care is low. Nevertheless, some observers might ar-
gue that hospital administrators choose to provide uncompensated
care of their own free wills, and that regulation has little or nothing
to do with its provision. We have argued otherwise above, and in
this section we argue that the constraint is indeed binding.
Much evidence is available for the case of for-profit hospitals.
Unlike nonprofit hospitals, for which managers might derive utility
64 The figures on the higher rail passenger deficit figure ($490 million) and total
rail revenues come from INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON
TRANSPORT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES 56-59 (1969) (reporting railway oper-
ating expenses). The higher rail cost figure is based on "fully distributed," or ac-
counting costs attributed to passenger trains, using what some believe to be arbitrary
accounting techniques. The lower-cost figure of $200 million is for those for services
and facilities solely related to rail passenger service. Id. at A-1. How overhead rail
costs should be allocated to passenger service is a topic of long-standing controversy-
-hence the wide range of passenger deficit figures. For a discussion of these issues,
see generally MEYER ET AL., supra note 8, at 145-67 (discussing the rational alloca-
tion of transportation resources); Theodore E. Keeler, The Economics of Passenger
Trains, 44J. BUS. 148 (1971).
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from providing uncompensated care, for-profit managers have lit-
tle incentive to give away shareholders' money - unless they are
required to do so. If private, for-profit hospitals feel compelled to
provide uncompensated care, then it follows that if nonprofit hos-
pitals chose not to provide uncompensated care, they would be pe-
nalized in a similar way. By arguing along these lines, we also
avoid the potential criticism that, because nonprofit hospitals are
charitable organizations, it is only their tax exemption that makes
our society force the provision of-uncom ensated care.
As Banks, Wendel, and PatersonE have argued, for-profit
hospitals treat uncompensated care as a cost of doing business. If
they are to do business, they must provide uncompensated care.
What could be a clearer definition of a de facto, but perhaps hid-
den, regulation? To analyze the extent to which uncompensated
care is indeed a cost of doing business, we intend to consider two
different sources of evidence: Bradford Gray's book on for-profit
health care,66 and considerable empirical evidence on the extent to
which for-profit hospitals provide uncompensated care.
Gray provides institutional evidence that for-profit hospitals
suffer tangible penalties from communities if they under-produce
uncompensated care relative to community expectations. 67 Hence,
his evidence suggests that for-profit hospitals supply uncompen-
sated care as a means of avoiding the penalty that results from
their failure to meet the community's expectation of a reasonable
amount. As a result, Gray argues that for-profit hospitals view the
provision of uncompensated care as a routine cost of doing busi-
ness.
68
Edward Norton and Douglas Staiger, in an important study in
the Rand Journal of Economics,69 using a data set generated during
the early 1980s (even before COBRA legislation), find that, rela-
tive to the number of indigent patients in a community, for-profit
hospitals provide just as much uncompensated care as nonprofit
hospitals. The only difference is that for-profit hospitals try to lo-
cate in communities with fewer indigent patients - but this sug-
65 Dwayne A. Banks et al., Uncompensated Hospital Care: Charitable Mission
or Profitable Business Decision?, HEALTH ECON., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 135 (discussing
how for-profit hospitals treat uncompensated care).
66 BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING
ACCOuNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS (1991).
67 Id.
68 ld.
69 Edward C. Norton & Douglas 0. Staiger, How Hospital Ownership Affects'
Access to Care for the Uninsured, 25 RANDJ. ECON. 171 (1994).
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gests that for-profit hospitals are subject to very much the same
effective regulatory structure as nonprofit hospitals. On average,
Norton and Staiger found uncompensated patients accounted for
5.2% of total admissions in for-profit hospitals, compared with
6.1% in nonprofit hospitals. 70
The more recent study by Banks, Wendel, and Paterson de-
velops a more sophisticated model of for-profit hospital behavior,
once again assuming that for-profit hospitals treat uncompensated
care as a cost of doing business. 71 These researchers also found
strong empirical support for the "cost-of-doing-business" ration-
ale.72
Thus, there is not only strong institutional evidence that for-
profit hospitals feel strongly obligated to provide uncompensated
care, but also clear, unambiguous evidence that they provide such
care in substantial quantities - almost as high as amounts provided
by nonprofit hospitals.
Why would for-profit hospital managers choose to give away
shareholders money in the form of uncompensated care if they
were not required to do so? If this is the case, how can it be
claimed that there is no regulation forcing cross-subsidization in
hospital care? The evidence in this area would seem quite clear:
hospitals behave as if they were regulated to provide uncompen-
sated care, and for our purposes, this is equivalent to regulation.
VI. FIRM RIVALRY AND THE EROSION OF
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION
In the transportation industries, firm rivalry, in either the price
dimension or the service quality dimensions, within modes or be-
tween modes, tended to dissipate the rents which were supposed to
be used to cross-subsidize over time (this is often called cream-
skimming). In the case of railroads, competition from trucks dissi-
pated the rents on high-valued commodities which the ICC ex-
pected railroads to spend on deficits for high-valued goods and for
passenger service. In the case of airlines, service quality rivalry
(frequency, capacity, and luxury) dissipated the rents which were
to be used to cross-subsidize low-density and short-haul service.
Indeed, in the last days of regulation, airlines were never able to
earn more than an "average" return on investment, and they were
constantly trying to escape provision low-density services. Rail-
70 Id. at 177.
71 See generally Banks et al., supra note 65, at 133-43.
72 id.
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roads earned below-normal returns and, before Amtrak and the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980,73 had much difficulty abandoning un-
profitable branch lines and discontinuing passenger services.
Models of uncompensated care provision in hospitals do
sometimes (but not always) predict the reduction of uncompen-
sated care with increased competition, and, indeed, Gruber's 74
analysis finds evidence that this will happen. However, none have
even considered the possibility (which is indeed a probability,
based on experience in transportation and telecommunications)
that competition could, over time, eliminate the ability of hospitals
to cross-subsidize indigent patients.
To understand why existing models of hospital behavior do
not consider the possibility that competition could eliminate cross-
subsidization, we must consider in some detail the model of Frank
and Salkever,75 of which the models underlying several other
studies of uncompensated care are extensions.76
Richard Frank and David Salkever - and each study above -
assume that the hospital is a competitive firm with a flat demand
curve and an upward-sloping marginal cost curve; the equilibrium
always entails price equals marginal cost.77 In the Frank and
Salkever model, as well as the others, profits used to cross-
subsidize indigent patients stem from the assumption that the price
which the hospitals are allowed to charge (by market forces, regu-
lators, or others) will always be above-average cost.78 Indeed, if
marginal cost is uniformly increasing, and there are no fixed costs,
then such profits will always exist, to some degree. However, in
the more conventional (and realistic) case of a U-shaped cost
curve, there is no guarantee that such profits will indeed exist. In
fact, in the case of a competitive market, as all elementary eco-
nomics students are taught, market equilibrium entails zero profits,
with price at average cost (equal to marginal cost at the point of
equilibrium). Hence, it is by no means clear that in a model such as
" 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1991) (providing for the restoration, maintenance, and
improvement of the physical facilities and financial stability of the U.S. rail system).
74 Jonathan Gruber, The Effects of Competitive Pressure on Charity: Hospital
Responses to Price Shopping in California, 13 J. HEALTH EcON. 183, 184 (1994).
75 Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, The Supply of Charity Services by
Nonprofit Hospitals: Motives and Market Structure, 22 RAND J. ECON. 430 (1991).
76 See generally Gruber, supra note 74; Norton & Staiger, supra note 69; Banks
et al ., supra note 65.
" Frank & Salkever, supra note 75, at 433.
78 Id.
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that of Frank and Salkever that a hospital will generally have the
revenues to cross-subsidize indigent care.
In addition, some observers believe the marginal cost of
treating indigent patients is below-average cost. However, this de-
pends on either scale economies (of which there is very little evi-
dence) or excess capacity (that is, marginal cost can be below av-
erage cost due to excess capacity). That is likely to be a temporary
situation: without government subsidies, firms will go out of busi-
ness if price is below long-run average cost for a significant length
of time (and many hospitals are closing, and many more should
close and will close).79 In short, Frank and Salkever and most sub-
sequent models of uncompensated care make the assumption that
the price paid by insured or self-paying patients will stay above the
long-run average cost. However, they fail to indicate what forces
will keep it there.
Those who expect hospitals to cross-subsidize indigent pa-
tients, while at the same time facing the full-force of competition
in the marketplace for paying patients, must present a model and
evidence to support this notion - especially in the long-run. We
have not seen such a model, and evidence from other industries
indicates that more regulation would at best be an inefficient
choice, and to some degree an ineffective way of achieving this
goal.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have several important conclusions, suggestions for fur-
ther research, and implications for public policy. We have pre-
sented much evidence that several parallels exist in health care
regulation, relative to that which occurred in transportation and
telecommunications. Regulation and similar public policies en-
deavor to encourage - as in Medicare and tax laws - or force - as
in COBRA and anti-dumping laws - cross-subsidization in hospi-
tal care. However, these policies risk being undermined in hospital
care, much as they were in transportation some twenty-five years
ago.
This means that we will need to rely more and more on direct
support of indigent patients, rather than on cross-subsidies (cases
79 See generally Theodore E. Keeler & John S. Ying, Hospital Costs and Excess
Bed Capacity: A Statistical Analysis, 78 REV. ECON & STAT. 470 (1996) (suggesting
that the government should stop preventing hospital closings and consolidations
which eliminate excess capacity and reduces costs).
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of Oregon and Minnesota are relevant; also, New Jersey now uses
direct taxes rather than cross-subsidization for indigent care). We
cannot "have our cake and eat it too" - the benefits of competition
and cross-subsidization do not coincide (this is only one dimension
of health care in which we cannot "have our cake and eat it too").
Our conclusions on this count are quite similar to those of
Colombo and Hall s° and of Krause,81 all of whom cite further
problems (beyond the ones discussed here) with the use of laws
relating to nonprofit organizations to encourage cross-
subsidization of indigent patients.
This implies, as well, that policies to maintain cross-
subsidization in hospital care or health maintenance organizations
are misguided, because they are unlikely to work, based on evi-
dence thus far in health care- as well as experience in transporta-
tion and telecommunications. The "market forces" that brought an
end to cross-subsidies in transportation, and their substantial re-
duction in telecommunications, are at work in the health care sec-
tor. Thus, if our analogy is correct, we predict increasing pressures
for "deregulation" in health care, similar to that which occurred in
transportation and telecommunication. This has been occurring
incrementally, beginning with the elimination of CON laws and
hospital rate-setting programs in some states.
Moreover, further research should investigate the welfare loss
from market distortions produced by "sick taxes" (cross-subsidies
are taxes on paying sick patients); the welfare losses from such
taxes are likely to be large, compared with those from broader-
based taxes. Replacement of cross-subsidies with direct subsidies
should in any event provide significant welfare gains, from en-
hanced economic efficiency. Direct subsidies are also better con-
trolled by the electorate.
A final conclusion relates to the inappropriateness of addi-
tional regulation in health care. Some policy-makers may want to
reverse the trend to deregulate hospital care, by constructing a
system of additional regulations to bolster the currently failing
scheme of cross-subsidization. The evidence we have presented
here indicates that this would be a serious mistake.
80 See generally Colombo & Hall, supra note 3, at 34 (concluding that the issue
of hospital exemption is best resolved in the context of a thorough review and revi-
sion of national healthcare delivery policy).
81 See Krause, supra note 2, at 568 (stating that regulation under the Nonprofit
Hospital Sales Acts -will be costly to implement and will promote meaningless and
destructive litigation").
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Measure
Cost $29,572,097 $36,270,906 $381,180 $377,617,194 Total expend
INDI 2,820.14 9,838.26 0.00 186,655.00 Indigent days
MEDCD 7,803.48 14,785.10 0.00 203,137.00 Medicaid
days
MEDCR 14,462.10 15,091.53 0.00 129,801.00 Medicare
days
PRIV 15,750.10 18,701.00 11.88 158,504.00 Private pay
days
OUT 14,296.05 43,882.11 0.00 482,120.00 Outpatient
visits
BEDS 192.62 182.51 12.00 2,045.00 Bed Size
ALOS 6.52 6.34 1.02 149.92 Av. length of
stay
WAGE $7.03 2.21 $0.67 $33.87 Av. hourly
wage
NON 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 Nonprofit
dummy
PUB 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 Public
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dummy
DIS 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 District
dummy
DUMMY 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 No indigent
care
T 7.95 1.42 6.00 10.00 Time trend
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Table 2. Hospitals in Sample
[Vol. 9:1
Year nonprofit for-profit district public
1986-87 185 137 53 29
1987-88 171 123 55 30
1988-89 168 123 55 30
1989-90 170 116 55 30
1990-91 170 116 53 30
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Table 3: Regression results of impact of indigent care on hospital cost, for California's acute
care hospitals, spanning FY1986-FY1990.
Variable parameter' parameter
2
estimates estimates
wlbeds wlo beds
INTERCEPT 20080673 1991148
(494490.3) (494810.3)
OUTPUT VARIABLES
INDI 1399.99 1718.67
(97.03) (20.76)
MEDCD 179.67 267.93
(51.08) (49.52)
MEDCR 601.5 666.08
(37.57) (30.2)
PRIV 674.39 760.66
(40.3) (32.88)
OUT 114.18 122.64
(17.04) (16.91)
CONTROL VARIABLES
WAGE 520299.18 531092.69
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(22781.8) (20056.9)
BEDS 24559.35
(5818.1)
ALOS -320913.66 -130722.67
(134809.9) (133644.4)
NON 99599.26 -248082.4
(392993.7) (395573.8)
DIS -1218289.1 -1659961.9
(508552.1) (502345.6)
PUB -8129853.57 -9162288.1
(861609.4) (871422.6)
DUMMY -378553.48 -483862.4
(1949239) (1985420.1)
TIME 645689.51 625608.9
(177254.5) (181067.6)
OUTPUT INTERACTIONS
INDI*INDI 0.023 0.018
(0.003) (0.002)
INDI*OUT -0.008 -0.008
(0.001) (0.001)
INDI*PRIV -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.002)
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INDI*MEDCR 0.041 0.03
(0.005) (0.004)
INDI*MEDCD (0.012) (0.021)
(0.004) (0.003)
MEDCD*MEDCD -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.002) (0.001)
MEDCD*MEDCR -0.025 -0.016
(0.002) (0.002)
MEDCD*PRIV 0.006 0.008
(0.002) (0.001)
MEDCD*OUT 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001)
PRIV*PRIV -0.007 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001)
PRIV*OUT 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001)
PRIV*MEDCR -0.0005 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001)
UT*OUT -0.0001 -0.0004
0 (0.0001)
Ofr*MEDCR -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
1999]
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MEDCR*MEDCR -0.007 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001)
OUTPUT AND CONTROL VARIABLES INTERACTIONS
INDI*BEDS -1.3
(0.64)
MEDCD*BEDS 1.43
(0.37)
MEDCR*BEDS 1.81 -
(0.44)
PRIV*BEDS 1.65
(0.36)
OUT*BEDS 0.01
(0.09)
WAGE*BEDS 428.49
(236.66)
ALOS*BEDS -192.16
(1017.9)
YIME*BEDS -1266
(2301.7)
BEDS*BEDS -178.93 -
(38.67)
[NDI*ALOS -34.06 -27.15
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(36.82) (36.16)
MEDCD*ALOS -24.99 -28.51
(5.43) (5.08)
MEDCR*ALOS -20.63 -9.79
(9.65) (8.58)
PRIV*ALOS -35.94 -33.55
(6.96) (5.76)
OUT*ALOS 29.68 27.41
(4.33) (4.43)
WAGE*ALOS -3555.14 -3354.23
(1987.4) (1721.2)
TIME*ALOS -45841.28 -44625.16
(22964.2) (23007)
ALOS*ALOS 1169.24 1120.13
(575.67) (590.53)
INDI*WAGE 1.93 3.68
(2.65) (1.92)
MEDCD*WAGE 13.26 14
(1.63) (1.35)
MEDCR*WAGE 15.44 17.52
(1.71) (1.06)
PRIV*WAGE 10.24 11.61
HEALTH MATRIX
(1.22) (0.9)
OUT*WAGE 2.84 2.05
(0.46) (0.4)
TIME*WAGE 33549.78 30487.37
(8963.8) (7805.5)
WAGE*WAGE 46279.34 49540.58
(5112.39) (4453.3)
INDI*TIME 27.95 27.6
(36.15) (35.03)
MEDCD*TIME 10.89 9.51
(15.72) (15.57)
MEDCR*TIME 16.82 12.8
(15.34) (11.64)
PRIV*TIME 9.6 12.31
(13.51) (10.54)
OUT*TIME -2.08 -5.48
(4.77) (4.8)
TIME*TIME 138267.3 169585.48
(90410.8) (92804.3)
R-squared 0.9674 0.9651
Adjusted R-squared 0.8731
Observations (NT) 1891
[Vol. 9:1
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION IN HOSPITAL CARE
Table 4. Average Uncompensated care Expenditures as a Per Cent of Revenue and
Expenditures for California Acute Care Hospitals, Fiscal Years 1986-1990
Hospital type Per Cent Uncompensated Care with Per Cent Uncompensated Care
Beds in Cost Equation' without Beds in Cost Equationb
as per cent of as per cent of as per cent of as per cent of
revenue expenditures revenue expenditures
Nonprofit 3.1 3.1 3.8 3.8
For Profit 2.5 2.3 3.1 2.9
District 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.7
Public 26.6 20.3 32.7 24.9
a. Based on a marginal cost estimate of $1,399.90
b. Based on a marginal cost estimate of $1,718.67
19991
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